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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The underlying facts of this case are relatively simple and undisputed. In the 2012-2013
school year, the Nampa Education Association ("NEA") was chosen by the teachers of the
Nampa School District ("School District") as their exclusive representative pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 33-1272. R. at 51; Tr. p. 26, L. 11-18. Further, the School District recognized the NEA
as such and entered into negotiations with the NEA. R. at 17, 51. Ultimately, the School District
issued Standard Teacher Contracts to the teachers in the Nampa School District for the 20122013 in the Fall of 2012. R. at 17, 51.
In early December, 2012, the School District began to solicit teachers to modify the terms
and conditions of the Standard Teacher Contracts that were signed a few months prior. R. at 18.
This was done by way of a document entitled "Addendum to Continuing Teacher Contract." R.
at 34-35, 51, 58-59. The School District did not negotiate these addendum contracts pursuant to
Idaho Code § 33-1272, et seq. R. at 37, Tr. p. 26, L. 7-11. Instead, the School District called
mandatory meetings for the teachers to attend where these contracts were presented. R. at 18.
The NEA protested the use of these addendum contracts in two separate correspondences dated
December 14 and 18, 2012. R. at 60-64. Some teachers signed the addendum contracts and some
did not. R. at 18.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 25, 2013, the NEA filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment. R. at 4-8. The
Petition sought for a declaration of the validity of the addendum contracts pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 33-513, IDAPA 08.02.01.150, and Idaho Supreme Court case law.
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On April 18, 2013, the School District filed its Answer to Petition for Declaratory
Judgment. R. at 9-13.
On June 5, 2013, the School District filed Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment,
along with supporting Memorandum and exhibits, and Affidavit of Steve Kipp. R. at 14-38.
On July 5, 2013, the NEA filed Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, along with
supporting Memorandum and Affidavit of Mandy Simpson with exhibits. R. at 39-64.
On July 12, 2013, the School District filed Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Motion for
Summary Judgment. R. 65-71.
On July 17, 2013, the NEA filed Petitioner's Memorandum m Opposition to
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 72-81.
On July 25, 2013, the School District filed Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's
Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 82-89.
Also on July 25, 2013, the NEA filed Petitioner's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 90-99.
On August 1, 2013, at 9:00 a.m., a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment
was held before the Honorable Molly J. Huskey, after which Judge Huskey took the matter under
advisement.
On August 16, 2013, Judge Huskey filed her Order on Summary Judgment, finding that
the Addendum Contracts did not comply with Idaho Code§ 33-513 or Idaho Code§ 33-1272
and Idaho Code § 33-1273, declaring them unenforceable, and granting Petitioner's Motion for
Summary Judgment. R. at 100-11 7.
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On September 27, 2013, the School District filed its Notice of Appeal. R. at 118-123.
On October 9, 2013, the Supreme Court filed its Order Remanding to District Court,
suspending the appeal to allow for entry of Final Judgment, and instructing the District Court to
transmit a certified copy of said Final Judgment once entered. R. at 124.
On October 17, 2013, the District Court entered its Final Judgment. R. at 125-126.
On November 1, 2013, the School District filed its Amended Notice of Appeal. R. at
127-132.
On December 5, 2013, the District Court entered its Certificate of Exhibit, Certificate of
Clerk and Certificate of Service. R. at 133-135.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Respondent respectfully requests attorney fees be award to it on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 12-117, Idaho Code§ 12-120, and Idaho Code§ 12-121.
ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review.
The standard of review of the District Court's decision on summary judgment is well-settled.

In Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont County, 152 Idaho 207,268 P.3d 1159 (2012) this Court held:
Courts are empowered to adjudicate actions for declaratory relief. LC. §§ 101201, 1202. They review motions for summary judgment in such actions as they
would in other civil suits. See Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 770-71, 133
P.3d 1232, 1235-36 (2006) (applying I.R.C.P. 56(c) in a declaratory-relief
action).
This Court applies the same standard as the district court when ruling on a motion
for summary judgment. Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881,
890, 243 P.3d 1069, 1078 (2010). Summary judgment is appropriate if "the
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pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). When
considering a motion for summary judgment, this Court liberally construes the
record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and draws all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor. King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 909, 42
P.3d 698, 702 (2002).

Kepler, at 210,268 P.3d at 1162.
B.

The Nampa Education Association has Standing.
The Nampa Education Association has standing to bring this action. As held by the

District Court, the Nampa Education Association has standing in its own right to bring its
Petition for Declaratory Judgment because the Nampa Education Association has such a stake in
the outcome of the action as to ensure meaningful representation and advocacy. On appeal, the
School District asserts only two arguments in relation to standing: First, the Nampa Education
Association does not have standing because there is no injury; and Second, that the granting of a
declaratory judgment would not redress any injury.

Applying the legal standards discussed

below to the undisputed facts demonstrates that there is a sufficient basis to find the NEA had
standing to bring this declaratory action. Accordingly, the District Court's holding should be
affirmed.
This Court succinctly outlined the requirements of individual standing in the case of

Miles v. Idaho Power, 116 Idaho 635, 778 P .2d 757 (1989). In ,Miles, this Court held as follows:
The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues
the party wishes to have adjudicated. Valley Forge College v. Americans United,
454 U.S. 464, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). While the doctrine is easily
stated, it is imprecise and difficult in its application. O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d
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680 (Former 5th Cir.1982). However, the major aspect of standing has been
explained:
The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to
invoke the court's jurisdiction has "alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the
court so depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions." As refined by subsequent reformation, this requirement
of "personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a
"distinct palpable injury" to the plaintiff, but also a "fairly
traceable" causal connection between the claimed injury and the
challenged conduct. (Citations omitted.)

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620,
2630, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978).
Id. at 641, 778 P.2d at 763. Accordingly, for the Nampa Education Association to have standing,
it must have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adversariness .... " Id.
The appellate courts in Idaho have a long line of cases outlining the requirements of
associational, or organizational, standing.

The first of these cases was the Idaho Court of

Appeals case of Glengmy-Gamlin Protective Association, Inc. v. Bonner County Bd. of Comm.,
106 Idaho 84, 675 P .2d 344 (Ct. App. 1983). The Glengary case dealt with an application to a
county board of commissioners for a conditional use permit.

Id. at 86, 675 P.2d at 346.

Although the case was brought pursuant to a question of an "affected person" under the Local
Planning Act, the Court of Appeals did take the occasion to establish the criteria for associational
standing. Id. at 87, 675 P.2d at 347. As the Court of Appeals noted, "Our research does not
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disclose a previously reported Idaho decision enumerating the elements of organizational
standing." Glengary-Gamlin Protective Association, Inc., at 87, 675 P.2d at 347. The Court of
Appeals then went on to analyze various U.S. Supreme Court decisions in relation to
organizational standing.
In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1368, 31 L.Ed.2d 636
( 1972), the Supreme Court said, 'It is clear that an organization whose members
are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review.' In
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), the
Supreme Court again stated that, even in the absence of injury to itself, an
association may have standing solely as the representative of its members. The
Court noted that 'to justify any relief the association must show that it has
suffered harm, or that one or more of its members are injured.' Id. at 515, 95
S.Ct. at 2213.

Id. The Court of Appeals then went on to reiterate the decision in Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 ( 1977) as follows:
[W]e have recognized that an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of
its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested, requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit.

Id. at 87-88, 675 P.2d at 347-348. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals determined that the
Association satisfied the three-part Hunt test, specifically finding that the Association did not
seek damages, but only judicial review and injunctive relief, and therefore there was no required
proof of injury claimed by the individual members of the Association. Id. at 89,675 P.2d 349.
Six years later, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted its opinion in Bear Lake Education

Association, et al. v. Board o,fTrustees of Bear Lake School District No. 33, 116 Idaho 443, 776
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P.2d 452 (1989). In Bear Lake Education Association, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed
associational standing specifically upon the part of a local education association similar to the
Respondents in the case at bar. Accordingly, the Bear Lake decision is most on point with the
issues before the Court in this case.
In Bear Lake Education Association, the local education association brought an action to
compel the School District to honor a portion of the Master Agreement related to arbitration of a
grievance. Id. at 444, 776 P.2d 453. Specifically, the Association asked the District Court to
compel the School District to comply with a specific article of the Master Agreement. Id. at 445,
776 P.2d 454. This Court found that the legislature had specifically "empowered and statutorily
required" the School District to negotiate with the local education association. Id. at 445, 776
P.2d 454. The Court further held "the Bear Lake Education Association is a 'local education
association' within the meaning of the Professional Negotiations Act, which represents the
teacher employees of School District No. 33." Id.
In addressing the School District's challenge to the Association's standing, this Court
cited with approval the analysis in Glengary-Gamblin Protective Association, supra, ) and
quoted with approval the "landmark case" of Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) as follows:
There is no question that an association may have standing in its own right to seek
judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities
the association itself may enjoy. Moreover, in attempting to secure relief from
injury to itself the Association may assert the rights of its members, at least so
long as the challenged infractions adversely affect its members' associational ties.
E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 [78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488] (1958).
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Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as
the representative of its members. National Motor Freight Assn. v. United States,
372 U.S. 246 [83 S.Ct. 688, 9 L.Ed.2d 709] (1963) .... The association must allege
that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury
as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable
case had the members themselves brought suit. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 734-41 [92 S.Ct. 1361, 1366-69, 31 L.Ed.2d 636] (1972). So long as this
can be established, and so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought
does not make the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to
proper resolution of the case, the association may be an appropriate representative
of its members, entitled to invoke the court's jurisdiction.

Bear Lake Education Association, at 448, 776 P.2d 457). The Court went on to hold, "If in a
proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective
relief: it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those
members of the association actually injured. Motor Freight, 372 U.S. at 247, 83 S.Ct. at 689."
Id.

Much like the Nampa Education Association, this Court held that the Bear Lake
Education Association was the "sole representative of the teacher employees of the district ...."
and that "any injury to an individual teacher within the association as a result of breaching the
master agreement would in tum be injurious to the Association." Id., at 448, 776 P.2d 457.
Whether it be a breach of the master agreement or of the statutory protections contained in Idaho
Code § 33-513 or Idaho Code § 33-1271, et seq., this holding should apply equally. Those
statutory protections, much like contractual protection in a Master Agreement, are essential
protections upon which teachers rely. Gilmore v. Bonner County School Dist. No. 82, 132 Idaho
257, 260, 971 P.2d 323, 326 (1999). This Court held, "Both the Association as a party to the
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Agreement, and each individual teacher as a member of the Association, have an interest in
having the Agreement [statute] enforced and interpreted for this and future relations." Bear Lake
Education Association, at 448, 776 P.2d 457).

It is also of crucial importance in the case at bar to note that this Court in Bear Lake
Education Association recognized that statutes creating legal rights may, in and of themselves,

establish the actual or threatened injury required for standing. This Court unambiguously held,
"Further, as standing often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted, the actual or
threatened injury may exist solely by virtue of "statutes creating legal rights. See Linda R.S.
v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 1148, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973)." Id. at 448-49,

776 P.2d 457-58 (emphasis added).
Much like the Bear Lake Education Association's filing of a declaratory judgment action
to enforce terms of the Master Agreement, the NEA has likewise filed a declaratory judgment to
enforce terms of Idaho Code. Further, like the Bear Lake Education Association, the NEA has
an interest in seeing the statutory protections enforced which are "germane to the association's
purpose and affects the associational ties of all teachers," and the possibility that the School
District would be allowed to unilaterally ignore statutory provisions, "affects all of the members
and, therefore, vests the Association with standing to sue on behalf of all the teachers." Bear
Lake Education Association at 449, 776 P.2d 458).

As previously discussed, the terms of the Standard Teacher Contract signed by all the
teachers in the Nampa School District incorporate by reference the laws of the state ofldaho, the
Rules of the Board of Education and the policies of the School District. R. at 54, i)4. This
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incorporation by reference includes the incorporation of Idaho Code § 33-513 (limiting contracts
to forms approved by the state superintendent of public instruction), ID APA 08.02.01.150
(prohibiting unapproved deviations from the Standard Teacher Contract), as well as Idaho Code

§ 33-1271, et seq. NEA has alleged actual or threatened injury by way of the four (4) unpaid
furlough days. These statutes are protective of teachers and a violation of such reduces the level
of protection a teacher possesses. A finding of individualized injury, however, is unnecessary.
The Idaho Supreme Court, determining associational standing has held:
The question of associational standing often turns on the nature of the relief
sought. When an association seeks some form of prospective relief, such as a
declaration or an injunction, its benefits will likely be shared by the association's
members without any need for individualized findings of iajury that would
require the direct participation of its members as named parties. Hunt [v.
Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)] 432 U.S. at 343, 97
S.Ct. at 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d at 394. "Indeed," wrote the United States Supreme
Court in Hunt, "in all cases in which we have expressly recognized standing in
associations to represent their members, the relief sought has been of this kind."
Id. (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 515, 95 S.Ct. at 2213, 45 L.Ed.2d at 364).
Beach Lateral Water Users Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600,604, 130 P.3d 1138, 1142 (2006).
It should also be noted that the NEA represents the entire bargaining unit (members and

non-members alike) under the law. Idaho Code § 33-1273(1) provided "The local education
organization selected by a majority of the qualifying professional employees shall be the
exclusive representative for all professional employees in the district for purposes. of
negotiations." (Emphasis added.) Thus, a violation of the contractual and statutory rights of all
professional employees in the School District have been effected by the School District's actions,
not just those of the NEA.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 10

The District Court recognized the exclusive representative capacity of the NEA and held
that "the negotiation of wage or compensation contracts, and insistence that the local boards
comply with Idaho Code § 33-513, is still within the exclusive province of the Petitioner and
therefore, a contract purporting to affect wage and compensation would be injurious to Petitioner
if it was not properly negotiated." R. at 108. Indeed, the NEA has a duty of fair representation
for which it may have been liable to members of the bargaining unit had it not brought this
action. See Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of America, 100 Idaho 523, 602 P.2d 21 (1979).
Such exclusive representation coupled with a duty to all professional employees of the School
District, are another basis to find that the NEA had standing.
The language of the Declaratory Judgment Act itself demonstrates that Petitioner has
standing to bring this action and that it was the legislatures intent to allow for such actions as the
case at bar. Idaho Code § 10-1212 in particular demonstrate the broad nature of a declaratory
judgment action, "This act is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief
from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations, and is to be
liberally construed and administered." The broad scope of this act is further supported by the
criteria of what sort of determinations can be sought. Idaho Code § 10-1202 provides:
Anv person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings
constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may
have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
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(Emphasis added.) Idaho Code § 10-1213 defines "person" to include parties such as Petitioner.
Moreover, a contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach. Idaho
Code § 10-1203. It is also noteworthy that a court is vested with authority to make declaratory
determinations of rights "whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." Idaho Code § 101201. As such, the NEA has standing to bring this declaratory action.
C.

Idaho Code§ 33-513 was violated by the School District.
The District Court correctly found that the addendum contracts were in violation of Idaho

law and therefore unenforceable. The first issue that the District Court addressed was whether
the addendum contracts were employment contracts that complied with the requirements of
Idaho law. The issue of whether a contract violates statutory requirements is a question of law.
As this Court has stated:
Whether a contract violates a statute is a question of law for the Court to
determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case. A contract made for
the purpose of furthering any matter prohibited by statute is illegal,
unenforceable, and void. When a court is faced with an illegal contract, it denies
enforcement of the contract.

Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 227, 281, 207 P.3d 1008, 1012
(2009) (citations omitted). Each individual teacher's Standard Teacher's Contract incorporates
by reference Idaho statutory law. Brown v. Caldwell School District No. 132, 127 Idaho 112,
118, 898 P.2d 43, 49 (1995); Robinson v. Joint School District No. 150, 100 Idaho 263, 265, 596
P.2d 436, 438 (1979). This Court has further held that properly promulgated administrative rules
and regulations have the force and effect of law. Higginson v. Westergard, l 00 Idaho 687, 690,
604 P.2d 51, 54 (1979), cited in Mead v. Arnell , 117 Idaho 660, 665, 791 P .2d 410, 415 (1990).
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Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to
the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho
654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct.
App. 2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning.

Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219). If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is
no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation.

Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67.
The authority whereby an Idaho school district, or more particularly a school board, can
employ a certificated teacher is contained in Idaho Code

§

33-513. This Idaho Code section

provides in pertinent part:
The board of trustees of each school district including any specially chartered
district, shall have the following powers and duties:
1. To employ professional personnel, on written contract in a
form approved by the state superintendent of public
instruction, conditioned upon a valid certificate being held by
such professional personnel at the time of entering upon the duties
thereunder.

(Emphasis added.) The Superintendent of Public Instruction has, as required by Idaho Code
§

33-513, prepared a "Standard Teacher Contract" for the employment of certificated teachers.

That "Standard Teacher Contract" has a specific clause contained within it that provides:
This contract form was prepared pursuant to Section 33-513, Idaho Code, and
approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, as a contract which
may be used by school districts. Any other form must be approved by the State
Superintendent, and reviewed for reapproval every three years.
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R. at 54-55. Further, an administrative rule of the Idaho State Board of Education specifically
discusses the use of the "Standard Teacher Contract" and prohibits any deviation from the form
approved by the state superintendent of public instruction. ID APA 08.02.01.150 provides:
DEVIATION FROM STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FORM.

The State Superintendent of Public Instruction has approved a standard
employment contract form. Any deviation from this contract form must be
approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and reviewed for
reapproval once every three (3) years. (Section 33-513, Idaho Code).
IDAPA 08.02.01.150. (Emphasis added.) It should further be noted that the Nampa School
Board of Trustees itself never approved the modification of the employment of the teachers
signing the addendum contracts. Tr. p. 24, L. 5-9. This Court has held "The board has the
responsibility and exclusive authority to employ both professional and noncertificated personnel
necessary to maintain and operate the schools in the district. The board and the teachers within
the school district expect that the board will make employment decision and that those decisions
will follow the correct statutory procedure." Gilmore v. Bonner County School Dist. No. 82, 132
Idaho 257, 260, 971 P.2d 323, 326 (1999). (citations omitted.)
In the case at bar, the School District has conceded that the Addendum contracts
modified the terms and conditions of the Standard Teachers Contract signed by the teachers in
the Nampa School District at the conclusion of negotiations in the Fall of 2012. Tr. p. 32, L. 15
p. 33, L. 1. The School District admitted that the Addendum Contracts, when signed, pmi of
the employment contract. Id. The School District has also admitted that the Nampa School
Board did not approve of these Addendum Contracts. Tr. p. 24, L. 5-9. The School District
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further conceded at the summary judgment hearing that the addendum contracts were not on a
form approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Tr. p. 24, L. 5-8. As such, the
Addendum Contracts were, as a matter of law, illegal, unenforceable, and void. See Wernecke,

supra.) Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District Court's ruling on summary judgment.
This same conclusion was reached by this Court holding in Rhoades v. Idaho Falls

School Dist. No. 91, 131 Idaho 827, 965 P.2d 187 (1998). In Rhoades, the teacher was not
granted a contract for the subsequent year based upon documents that were not part of the
Standard Teachers Contract. Specifically, the teacher in Rhoades, much like the teachers in this
case, signed a document that was prepared by the school district and was separate and apart from
the Standard Teachers Contract. Id. at 828, 965 P.2d at 188. The Idaho Supreme Court squarely
held that any document other than the Standard Teacher Contract was "ineffective" and could not
change a teacher rights. The Court held:
LC. § 33-513(1) authorizes the board to employ professional personnel "on
written contract in form approved by the state superintendent of public
instruction." The contract signed by the teacher and the chair of the board for the
1992-93 school year bears a legend that it was prepared pursuant to LC. § 33-513
and that any other form of contract must be approved by the State Board of
Education. There is no evidence that the other documents on which the
district relies to remove the protections of the statutes and the master
contract were approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction or
the State Board of Education. Therefore, they were ineffective to change the
rights the teacher had under the statutes and the master contract.

Rhoades at 830, 965 P.2d 190 (emphasis added). As such, the District Court's ruling should be
affirmed.
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There are also good public policy grounds to affirm the District Court's ruling. When a
law is established for a public reason, it cannot be contravened by a private agreement restricting
rights guaranteed under a statute:
It is obvious what when a right, a privilege, or a defense is conferred upon an
individual by the law, it is conferred upon him because it is believed to be in the
public interest to do so. In many such cases it is believed to be contrary to the
public interest to permit him to waive or bargain away the right, privilege, or
defense; and when it is so believed the attempted waiver or bargain is inoperative.
In these cases the waiver or bargain may itself be described as 'illegal' but only in
the sense that it is legally inoperative.

6A Corbin, Contracts,§ 1515 "Power to Waive or Bargain Away Rights and Defenses Conferred
by Statute" pp. 728-731. If this Court held that the actions of School District were permissible, it
would nullify the protections and utility of the Standard Teachers Contract required under Idaho
Code§ 33-513. There would be no benefit to having standardized terms and condition because
any provision or term could be subsequently modified at the discretion of the school district. In
such an instance, the statute and rule quoted above would be rendered superfluous. As this Court
has held, "It is incumbent upon [the] Court to interpret a statute in a manner that will not nullify
it and it is not to be presumed that the legislature performed an idle act of enacting a superfluous
statute." Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572, 798 P.2d 27, 31 (1990). It is clear, however,
from the language of both Idaho Code§ 33-513(1) and IDAPA 08.02.01.150 that the intent of
the state legislature was to have a single, state-wide approved form to be a standardized contract
for all Idaho teachers and no other.
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D.

Mootness.

The NEA's claims are not moot because there is a definite and concrete legal issue to be
resolved that touches upon the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal interests. The
standard for determining whether an issue is moot in a declaratory judgment action was
articulated by this Court in the case of Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317,
297 P.3d 1134 (2013). In Bettwieser, the Court held that under Idaho's Declaratory Judgment
Act, the trial court's jurisdiction is limited to cases "where an actual or justiciable controversy
exists," and courts are thus precluded "from deciding cases which are purely hypothetical or
advisory." Bettwieser at 326, 297 P.3d at 1143 (quoting Wylie v. Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho
26, 31, 253 P.3d 700, 705 (2011)). The Court in Bettwieser went on to discuss the factors
involved in determining whether a justiciable controversy exists as follows:
This Court has explained that a justiciable controversy is:
[D]istinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or
abstract character; from one that is academic or moot .. .. The
controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal
relations of the parties having adverse legal interests .... It must be a
real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through
a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts.

Davidson v. Wright, 143 Idaho 616, 620, 151 P.3d 812, 816 (2006) (quoting
Weldon v. Bonner County Tax Coalition, 124 Idaho 31, 36, 85 5 P .2d 868, 873
(1993)). Therefore, "[a]n action for declaratory judgment is moot where the
judgment, if granted, would have no effect either directly or collaterally on the
plaintiff, the plaintiff would be unable to obtain further relief based on the
judgment and no other relief is sought in the action." Wylie, 151 Idaho at 32,253
P.3d at 706 (quoting Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd.
of Educ., 128 Idaho 276,282,912 P.2d 644,650 (1996)).
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Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317,297 P.3d 1134 (2013).

Applying the standards above to the facts in the record, the NEA's claims are not moot,
but actual and justiciable.

First, the dispute over the Addendum Contracts is not of a

"hypothetical or abstract character." The use of the Addendum Contacts was, as argued above,
in violation of Idaho Code, IDAP A rules, and Idaho Supreme Court case law. This actually
happened and could happen again. As such, the controversy before the Court is "definite and
concrete."
Second, the Court must determine whether this controversy touches upon "the legal
relations of the parties having adverse legal interests." The parties to this case have distinct legal
interests in this matter. One the one hand, the School District wishes to have the legal authority
to modify through its own, unapproved 1 contract, the terms and conditions contained in the
Standard Teachers Contract. On the other hand, the NEA wishes to have the requirements of
Idaho Code § 33-513, IDAPA 08.02.01.150, and corresponding law upheld, and be employed
only using the Standard Teachers Contract. The parties have adverse legal interests in this matter
and such controversy effects the relations, contractual and employment, between the School
District and the professional employees.
Third, this action seeks "specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character." The
relief sought through the provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act is a declaration of legal

1

Unapproved by either the state Superintendent of Public Instruction or the Nampa School Board of Trustees. Tr.
p. 24, L. 5-9.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 18

status, rights and validity of an Addendum Contract signed for the 2012-2013 school year. Idaho
Code§ 10-12022 provides:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other \Vritings
constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may
have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or under legal relations thereunder.
Further, the Declaratory Judgment Act provides that a contract may be construed either
before or after there has been a breach thereof.

Idaho Code § 10-1203.

In this matter, a

declaration on the issue of the legality of the Addendum Contracts would terminate both
uncertainty of the use of Addendum Contracts, as well as the current controversy.
Fourth, the NEA through this declaratory judgment action is not seeking "an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts" but a specific declaration of
the invalidity of the use of unapproved Addendum Contracts.

The use of the Addendum

Contract had real-life implications for individuals and their protected rights under Idaho Code.
The teachers in the Nampa School District had a right to rely on those provisions, both as a
matter of contract (R. at 54, i!4) and a matter of statutes. See Gilmore v. Bonner County School
Dist. No. 82, 132 Idaho 257,260,971 P.2d 323,326 (1999).

Lastly, the declaratory judgment will have an effect, either directly or collaterally, on the
NEA and its members. As discussed above, such a judgment takes away the uncertainty of

2

"Person" is defined as "any person, partnership, joint stock company, unincorporated association or society, or
municipal or other corporation of any character whatsoever." Idaho Code§ 10-1213.
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teacher contracts and whether the School District is limited to only the Standard Teacher
Contract. It will also take away uncertainty as to whether the Addendum Contracts used in the
2012-2013 were themselves legal, and/or whether such contracts are permissible in the future.
The legality of the Addendum Contracts may also lead to further relief. As the District Court
held:
[I]f the relief asked for is granted, that declaration would have an effect either
directly or collaterally - as Petitioner can thereafter use the declaration, if granted,
to prevent future types of contracts. Additionally, if the Addendum Contract is
determined to be illegal, Petitioner could seek further relief on behalf of its
members. As such, although the contracts have been fully executed, the issue is
not moot.
R. at 110.
Accordingly, the undisputed facts in the record applied to the standards outlined in
Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 297 P.3d 1134 (2013) demonstrate that
the issue was and is not moot.
E.

Idaho Code§ 33-1272, et seq., was violated by the School District.

The District Court correctly held that the School District violated Idaho Code § 33-1272,
et seq. when it by-passed the recognized, exclusive bargaining agent for the professional,
certificated employees and offered the Addendum Contracts to teachers at mandatory
"emergency" meetings. In addition to the grounds discussed above, the Addendum Contracts are
illegal and unenforceable.
Idaho Code§ 33-1271 requires that all negotiations regarding the terms and conditions of
employment of certificated personnel be negotiated with the duly recognized local education
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organization. Specifically, Idaho Code§ 33-1271, as it existed in the fall of 2012, stated that the
School Board of Trustees shall negotiate with the local education association "in good faith on
matters related to compensation of professional employees." Idaho Code§ 33-1273, as it existed
at that time, provided that the duly chosen and recognized local education association "shall be
the exclusive representative for all professional employees in that district for purposes of
negotiations." (Emphasis added.) Idaho Code§ 33-1273 further provided that the School Board
of Trustees shall negotiate "only with the local education organization or its designated
representative(s)." (Emphasis added.)
The undisputed facts of this case applied to the law as it existed in the fall of 2012
demonstrates that the School District violated the provisions of the Idaho Code§ 33-1271, et seq.
when it by-passed the exclusive bargaining representative and directly negotiated with the
professional, certificated employees. Tr. p. 26, L. 7-11. The School District has admitted that it
negotiated terms and conditions of employment with the NEA for the 2012-2013 school year. R.
at 17, 51. The School District has further admitted that the professional certificated employees
signed their respective Standard Teacher Contracts as the conclusion of the bargaining. Id.
Moreover, it is undisputed that the School District later, when facing certain financial distress,
by-passed the bargaining representative and approached the teachers directly about changing the
terms and conditions of their employment contract. R. at 18. Much like the provisions of Idaho
Code § 33-513, discussed above, the right of a teacher to be represented by their exclusive
bargaining representative is incorporated into the Standard Teacher Contract. R. at 54, ,i4. See

also Brown v. Caldwell School District No. 132, 127 Idaho 112, 118, 898 P.2d 43, 49 (1995);
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Robinson v. Joint School District No. 150, 100 Idaho 263, 265, 596 P.2d 436, 438 (1979).
Further, as noted by the District Court," ... [T]he procedures set forth in LC. §§ 33-1271 to 1276 reflect the legislature's determination that structured negotiation procedures would benefit
not only school districts and teachers, but the public as well." Gilbert v. Nampa School Dist. No.

131, 104 Idaho 137,147,657 P.2d 1, 11 (1983).
For the above articulated reasons, as well as those discussed by the District Court in its
Order on Summary Judgment (R. at 100-117), the conclusion by the District Court that the
School District violated the provisions ofldaho Code§ 33-1271, et seq. should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, as well as the arguments and citation previously made in this
matter, the Nampa Education Association respectfully requests this Court affirm the District
Court's Order on Summary Judgment.
DATED this 1J1h day of April, 2014.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

By:~
'Stark, General Counsel
ey for Respondent Nampa Education Assn.
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